No Easy Fix: Why the U.S. Won’t Confront Russia in Syria

By John Zmirak Published on February 24, 2016

It’s a popular applause line among Republicans to call for the United States to “stand up” to Vladimir Putin over his policy in Syria — which amounts to propping up the shaky regime of Bashir al-Assad, and bombing both ISIS and the “moderate” Islamist rebels who some Republicans, such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, want the U.S. to back to the hilt. And most conservatives agree that President Obama’s muddled, half-hearted policies have made the situation in Syria worse than it needed to be. In his quest “to not do stupid stuff,” President Obama seems to have cherry-picked incompatible actions from each of the three major schools of U.S. foreign policy thinking, Liberal Internationalism, Neoconservatism, and Realism. In turn, Obama has:

  • Encouraged the overthrow of a secular autocracy in Syria, which helped to ignite a civil war.
  • Refused to intervene directly to smooth that overthrow.
  • Drawn “red lines” that threatened Assad’s regime if it used chemical weapons against Islamist revolutionaries.
  • Backed away from those red lines, and outsourced a settlement to the Russians.
  • Continued half-hearted support to unreliably “moderate” rebels, who let U.S. money and weapons fall into hands of their Al Qaeda allies.
  • Allied with Syrian-based Kurdish militias who fight ISIS effectively but threaten an unstable Turkey.
  • Continued to muddle along in negotiations which place Russia and Turkey on a collision course.

Any one of these decisions could have been justified as part of a coherent policy, but not all of them together, since they point to radically different conclusions to the conflict. No outcome will be entirely satisfying to America, since there are no tolerant Jeffersonian democrats waiting in the wings to transform Syria into a pro-American liberal democracy that protects religious freedom. The question is, which of the following likely outcomes is least unacceptable to the U.S.?

  • The defeat of Assad’s regime, and its replacement by an Islamist government allied to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and almost entirely beholden to them for its victory. The fate of Alawites and Christians under such a regime is completely uncertain, and both groups would face danger even in Sunni-dominated refugee camps, so they might end up — like many Christian refugees from Iraq and Syria — completely unprotected. Such a regime might fight and defeat ISIS, since it represents only a somewhat less radical version of Sunni theocracy.
  • The survival of a rump Alawite regime in Damascus, deeply beholden to Russia, which supports Kurdish militias that destabilize an increasingly hot-headed regime in Turkey, and Shi’ite dissidents throughout the Gulf States. Such a regime might go on to engage ISIS, or might leave it in place, since Russia is unlikely to back Damascus in the grim, perhaps futile task of reconquering Sunni regions of Syria.
  • The commitment of tens of thousands of U.S. troops in a multi-sided conflict, where no major player is pro-Western or committed to religious freedom. (See Iraq.)

So while it’s satisfying to snipe at a haughty, disengaged amateur who is failing spectacularly to exert U.S. influence in the region, things get a lot more complicated when you try to sketch out what would be the right course of action. There’s an entire symposium in the New York Times, featuring learned foreign policy experts at total loggerheads over what we should do next.

Here are several stubborn realities that face us:

  1. The Assad regime is ruthless and bloody-minded. It is also the only plausible protector of two large minority groups in Syria: the Alawites (Assad’s own minority Shi’a split–off), and the Christians, who number around a million and have no other safe refuge in the region — certainly not Iraq. That argues against replacing Assad with some unknowable regime that might very well ethnically cleanse another million Christians, as were purged from Iraq after the U.S. invasion.
  2. The Assad regime is allied to Iran, which provides most of its effective ground troops. Iran is the only Shi’ite government on earth (though Iraq now leans in that direction), and it claims to represent the interests of millions of disefranchised Shia in countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen, whose governments the U.S. doesn’t want to see toppled. (Iran is also seeking nuclear weapons, but that is irrelevant to the situation in Syria.)
  3. Russia, which ruthlessly invaded Ukraine, is backing Syria’s government in order to secure a) its naval base at Latakia b) its influence in the region and c) the safety of Christians. Russia is also clashing head on with Turkey, on paper our NATO ally whom we are committed to defend.
  4. Turkey is not a Western-oriented democracy, but an increasingly aggressive Islamist regime. It has shunted more than a million “Syrian refugees” into Europe in violation of international law, and is threatening to ship up to three million more if its will is frustrated in Syria. Turkey is also so committed to stomping out a Kurdish insurgency that it threatens to attack the Kurds who represent the only effective ground force fighting ISIS.
  5. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States are desperate to keep down their large, unrepresented Shia minorities, and are backing Al Qaeda-linked militias in Syria — and threatening to send ground troops to confront Russia and Iran, and turn the tide in the war.

A situation this complex and dismal requires serious, careful thought. And American Christians need to look at all the factors involved, weighing the atrocities of the Assad regime against the danger posed by Assad’s enemies to local Christians, the prospect of growing Iranian influence against the increasingly aggressive Islamism of the Turkish and Saudi governments. There is no simple solution waiting out there for a “courageous” president to seize.

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